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The dispute between the EU Council of Ministers and the Irish 
government about the appropriate stance for Irish fiscal policy this year 
highlights a number of issues that are of much wider importance for the 
euro area. It raises the question of the extent to which co-ordination of 
fiscal policy is needed within Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and, 
if it is needed, how it is to be implemented. For Ireland there is a separate 
question: even if the current stance of fiscal policy is unlikely to have any 
negative implications for other member states in the union, is it 




This article focuses only on the economic issues arising from the 
current debate about fiscal policy in Ireland and in the euro area. It does 
not consider the wider legal and diplomatic concerns that have arisen. 
Also, in considering the need for a development of the current co-
ordination framework for fiscal policy in the euro area, it does not confine 
itself to policy formation within the existing legal framework. Instead it 
considers how that framework needs to evolve to deal with the changing 
policy needs of the developing EMU. 
Section 2 considers the appropriate stance for Irish fiscal policy from 
an Irish point of view. It considers the measurement of the fiscal impulse 
and a range of factors that determine the appropriate stance of fiscal 
policy: the underlying potential growth of the Irish economy, the extent of 
inflationary pressures in the labour market and the goods market, and how 
the Irish economy can best adjust to these pressures. The effectiveness of 
fiscal policy in dealing with these problems is considered and the 
implications of medium and long-term prospects for the economy are also 
discussed. 
Section 3 discusses the appropriate objectives for fiscal policy co-
ordination in the euro area. It first discusses why co-ordination of fiscal 
policy is necessary and desirable within EMU. The lessons of German 
unification in the 1990s are instructive in this regard. The operational 
experience of the first two years of EMU provides some insights into how 
fiscal policy co-ordination needs to evolve in the future. In particular, the 
recent debate about the Irish economy provides some wider lessons. Section 4 presents conclusions suggesting a need for a change in Irish 
fiscal policy, as well as a change in the focus of the EU guidelines for fiscal 
policy. 
 
 Over the last twenty-five years many papers have been published on 
fiscal policy in Ireland. Dowling (1978) set out an approach to measuring a 
cyclically adjusted budget deficit for Ireland, an approach that is now fairly 
standard. Most recently, a detailed discussion of a range of different 
measures of “fiscal stance” was contained in Kearney et al. (2000). What all 
the measures have in common is an attempt to measure how changes in 
policy on government expenditure and taxation, taken together, impact on 




Because government revenue and expenditure are both greatly affected 
by the state of the economic cycle, the change1 in the government surplus 
or deficit on its own is not a good measure of fiscal stance. What is 
required is a measure of the change in the surplus (deficit), purging out 
these cyclical effects. Looking at the Irish economy today, it is clear that 
the growth rate of the last five years is unsustainable. As a result, the 
government surplus is in some sense exceptional and cannot be relied on 
to continue at its current level when the economy returns to its trend 
growth rate. Thus an important element in considering the underlying 
stance of fiscal policy is an understanding of the potential growth rate of 
the economy. 
POTENTIAL GROWTH RATE OF THE IRISH ECONOMY AND 
THE FISCAL STANCE 
The best estimate of the potential growth rate of GNP in the Irish 
economy is that, while it was around 8 per cent a year between 1995 and 
2000, it should fall to 5 per cent a year over the period 2000 to 2005. The 
basis for this estimate was set out in the ESRI Medium-Term Review (Duffy 
et al., 1999) and was further discussed in Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2000). 
It appears that the rate of productivity growth in the Irish economy is 
currently around 4 per cent a year, measured in terms of GDP, or 3 per 
cent a year measured in terms of GNP. While employment growth 
averaged 5 per cent a year in the last five years and labour force growth 
was 3.4 per cent a year, the growth in labour force is expected to fall to a 
more moderate 2 per cent a year over the next five years. In addition, with 
unemployment now at a very low level, the growth in employment in the 
next few years must be similar to the growth in the labour force. As a 
result, it is this fall in labour supply that will constrain the rate of growth 
of the economy to around 5 per cent a year over the period 2000 to 2005. 
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The estimates of labour supply growth have in the past proved 
unreliable. In particular, migration has confounded expectations. 
Modelling work on migration behaviour suggests that labour supply in 
Ireland has been very elastic in the past. However, infrastructural 
constraints mean that the country can not accommodate all the returning 
emigrants, and skilled foreign labour prepared to work in Ireland. If and 
1 What is important is the change in the surplus (deficit), not its absolute value. In a static 
economy with no growth and no inflation, an unchanging surplus (deficit) would be 
consistent with unchanging demand for goods and services.   3
 
when this infrastructural constraint is relaxed by government investment, 
the potential growth rate could prove higher than estimated. However, it 
will be quite a number of years before current investment plans begin to 
have a big impact.2 
The EU Commission use a standardised methodology to estimate the 
potential growth rate and, as a result, the government’s fiscal stance. It is 
applied by each country and published in the Irish case in the national 
Stability Programme (Budget 2001). Because the potential growth rate 
using the EU methodology is derived by applying a filter (moving average) 
to output in the relatively recent past, it takes no account of the changed 
circumstances in labour supply, suggesting a potential growth well over 5 
per cent in the immediate future. Using this EU Commission 
methodology, the Budget for 2001 appears as only mildly stimulatory. By 
contrast, a model based approach, as described in Kearney et al. (2000) 
would indicate that the budget has provided a strong demand stimulus this 
year. The fact that the expected surplus remains high partly reflects the 
fact that the economy is still growing well above its long-term capacity 
growth rate, indicated by a large output gap. 
The fiscal stimulus is taking place against the background of an 
economy operating at capacity. In response to increased demand it is very 
difficult to actually increase output. As a result, the effect of the stimulus 
must be some combination of increased imports and a rise in the price of 
domestic factors of production and non-tradable goods and services. 
LABOUR MARKET IMBALANCES 
As set out in the last ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary (McCoy et al., 
2000), there appears to have been a major change in the responsiveness of 
the labour market to shifts in demand in the last few years. This arises 
from the impact of the infrastructural constraints on migration. Until 
recently the elasticity of skilled labour supply was infinite in the long run 
because an unlimited number of Irish workers would come back to work 
in Ireland for wage rates around 5 per cent less than they could get 
elsewhere (Kearney, 1999). Similarly, many skilled foreigners were happy 
to come to Ireland. However, the very rapid rise in housing costs has 
changed the after tax real cost of living in Ireland for migrants compared 
to what is on offer in the UK, Germany, France and Scandinavia.3 
In the past, with an infinitely elastic supply of skilled labour, the effect 
of tax cuts was to reduce the tax inclusive cost of labour to employers. 
The demand effects of such a fiscal stimulus were partly offset by the 
elasticity of labour supply. The result was higher employment at lower cost 
to the business sector. In these circumstances tax cuts did not have a 
significant inflationary impact in the labour market. 
The moderation in wage formation behaviour in the 1980s and the 
1990s was due more to market forces than to the Social Partnership. As 
discussed in Fitz Gerald (2000), “…while the agreements have probably 
served to validate the rate of increase in wage rates that market forces 
2 This is a case where investment in public physical capital can have a very high potential 
return. 
3 While the reduction in net immigration in the year to April 2000 was small, adjustment must 
be made for the increased influx of asylum seekers, who are not allowed to work. This implies 
a significant reduction in the supply of labour from outside Ireland.   4
 
determined, this ‘validation’ was obtained with less industrial strife than in 
earlier periods – a significant benefit”.4 However, from the late 1990s 
Ireland has entered a new labour market regime (Walsh, 1999), not just 
because of EMU entry, but also because a range of factors have reduced 
the elasticity of labour supply. The supply of labour is now very inelastic. 
The latest data from the CSO Quarterly National Household Survey show 
that changing female labour force participation made little contribution to 
increasing labour supply over the last year, in spite of favourable changes 
in the tax system. Under these circumstances tax cuts all accrue to 
employees as a rise in their after-tax disposable income, and there is very 
little labour supply response. The demand side effects dominate the supply 
side effects, and tax cuts give a significant impulse to wage inflation.  
The 2001 Budget involved discretionary cuts in tax rates which 
amounted to up to 0.5 per cent of GDP. However, the major fiscal 
stimulus was on the expenditure side, where the government have 
budgeted for a big increase in employment in the public sector to provide 
improved services amounting, directly or indirectly, to between 1 and 1.5 
per cent of the total labour force. By further tightening the labour market, 
this fiscal impulse will fuel the rate of inflation in wage rates. 
IRISH INFLATION 
All studies of the inflationary process in Ireland over the last twenty-five 
years have found that goods prices are externally determined. Quinn, 
Kenny and Meyler (1999) summarise this evidence. In the case of the price 
of the output of the manufacturing sector, prices are fully externally 
determined (Callan and Fitz Gerald, 1989).5 For aggregate consumer 
prices this is also true, though the speed of transmission of external 
shocks has changed with the advent of EMU (Fitz Gerald and Shortall, 
1998). While it also holds true for inflation in consumer goods prices, 
inflation in the price of non-tradables − domestically produced services 
and house prices − is significantly affected by domestic wage rates (Meyler, 
1999, and Kenny and McGettigan, 1999). However, these elements either 
have a low weighting, 16 per cent in the case of domestic services prices, 
or do not appear at all in the consumer price index, such as house prices  
While the process of convergence in living standards could be 
expected to lead to higher inflation in Ireland, this can only account for a 
limited part of the differential in the rate of growth in consumer prices 
(Blanchard 2001, and Rogers, Hufbauer and Wada, 2001). The main 
reason for Irish consumer price inflation exceeding the EU average by a 
significant margin is external factors – exchange rates and the price of oil. 
However, it is not true to say that Ireland does not have an inflationary 
problem. This is apparent in the rapid rise in wage rates and in the 
feedback from the housing market to a reduced propensity to immigrate 
with the consequential reduction in the elasticity of labour supply. The 
rapid rise in the rate of wage inflation poses dangers for the Irish 
economy, but not necessarily for the euro area.  
4 The “Partnership Approach” brought a wide range of other benefits to policy making in 
Ireland. These included more cohesive and coherent policy-making process that proved of 
major benefit in undertaking the necessary fiscal adjustment in the late 1980s.  
5 The relevant equations in the latest version of the ESRI HERMES macro-economic model 
suggest that output prices are still externally determined.   5
 
MACRO-ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
In the medium to long term the first priority of fiscal policy will be to 
invest in adequate public infrastructure to release key bottlenecks in the 
economy. The National Development Plan announced at the end of 1999, 
provides for such a programme. However, with resources in the building 
industry stretched to their limits, it is desirable that such investment be 
accompanied by measures aimed at freeing up resources in the building 
industry. An overall restrictive stance in other aspects of fiscal policy could 
help free up resources in the wider economy to undertake essential 
investment.  
The Irish economy is currently suffering from excess demand due to it 
being “too competitive”. The excess demand is coming as much from the 
external sector as from domestic demand (Blanchard, 2001). This is 
reflected in the balance of payments, which has remained close to balance 
over the last three years, in spite of the very rapid growth in the economy. 
As discussed above, the result of the growth in demand is a very rapid 
rise in wage rates, forecast to be nearly 11 per cent for 2001. The share of 
labour in value added fell steadily since the early 1980s, indicating an 
improvement in underlying competitiveness. However, this can not 
continue indefinitely and some reversal might be expected (Lane, 1998). A 
real appreciation6 is called for to reduce competitiveness and to bring 
demand into balance with supply in the labour market (Fitz Gerald, 
Kearney and Morgenroth, and Smyth, 1999). This will reverse the trend 
growth in profitability. 
It is not clear how much of a real appreciation is needed to bring the 
labour market back into balance. This would be easier to manage through 
a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate, where overshooting could, if 
necessary, be corrected through further exchange rate adjustments. 
However, within the euro area, it must occur through higher wage 
inflation. 
The danger for the Irish economy with this process is that inflationary 
expectations in the labour market may result in the real appreciation 
overshooting. People may get used to an annual rate of wage inflation of 
10 per cent or more a year. While this may be sustainable this year, if it 
continued it would rapidly price Ireland out of its external markets. Unless 
wage rates adjust instantaneously to clear the market in the future, any 
overshooting of wage rates could prove costly. Under EMU, if nominal 
and, therefore, real wage rates grow too rapidly, making the economy 
uncompetitive, correction can only come about through either a cut in 
nominal wages, or through nominal wage rates standing still while inflation 
in the euro area catches up. Cuts in nominal wage rates are most unusual. 
Relying, instead, on a slow process of attrition could see the economy 
remaining uncompetitive for some time, with a consequential serious cost 
in terms of unemployment and lost output. 
For this reason stimulatory fiscal policy, that aggravates the rate of 
wage inflation and fuels expectations about future wage increases, is 
unwise. The rapid increase in domestic labour costs could expose the 
economy to unnecessary dislocation in the event of an unexpected 
6 Where the cost of labour in Ireland, measured in a common currency, rises relative to costs 
in competitors. external shock. Blanchard (2001) considers the appropriate adjustment 
process for both Ireland and Spain. He concludes that, because of the 
relatively strong balance of payments position of Ireland, the adjustment 
should come through a combination of wage inflation and some fiscal 
contraction. In the case of Spain, because of the starting position of a 
balance of payments deficit, it is appropriate that the bulk of adjustment 
should be undertaken through a tightening of fiscal policy. Such a nuanced 
approach to fiscal policy in regions of the euro area needs to be further 
developed by the EU Commission. 
 
 Fiscal policy is not an effective instrument for controlling the rate of 
inflation in consumer prices in an economy such as Ireland. This has been 
widely accepted by the economics profession for more than twenty-five 
years (Geary, 1975). As discussed earlier, where the goods market is fully 
open and there is perfect competition between foreign and domestic firms 
(a good approximation in the case of Ireland). In this case fiscal policy can 
only affect the economy through the balance of payments, the labour 








In a monetary union, the balance of payments effects of excess 
demand do not feed back on the economy through exchange rates or 
other monetary effects. Unless domestic agents' indebtedness rises to such 
an extent that the risk premium on lending rises, there is no direct effect 
through this channel on domestic activity. 
Table 1: Effects of Fiscal Stimulus Costing £500 million, Assuming 
a Rising Labour Supply Curve with No Migration 
Percentage Change in Levels on No Policy Change 
Scenario 
  Increase in Employment 
in Public Administration 
Cut in Income Tax 
Year  1  3  1  3 
Consumer Prices  0.18  0.47  0.05  0.13 
Wage Rates  1.37  1.37  0.35  0.35 
Source:   Quarterly Economic Commentary, 2000 December, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute,. 
 
While fiscal policy may be ineffective in controlling consumer price 
inflation, it can have an important effect on the labour market. As 
discussed in the December 2000 Quarterly Economic Commentary, where the 
government increases expenditure to hire more labour, the impact on 
wage rates will be even stronger where labour supply is constrained. Model 
simulations (Table 1) indicate that the long-run impact of a volume 
increase in public expenditure of £1 billion is to raise wage rates in the 
economy as a whole by between 2.5 and 3 percentage points. Where there 
is full employment wage rates have to rise by enough to free up potential 
employees from private sector firms (discouraging them from expanding 
or even putting them out of business) to make them available to the public 
sector. 
In addition to its potential effects through the labour market, fiscal 
policy can also have an important effect on the allocation of resources 
within the economy by changing incentives. For example, fiscal policy can 
have a significant effect on the domestic housing market through changing 
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household disposable income and through changing the cost of capital for 
homeowners.7 The tax treatment of interest payments on house loans can 
have a big effect on the cost of capital for homeowners. Because the legal 
instrument under which mortgage lending takes place is country specific, 
the taxation or subsidisation of mortgage interest payments is not affected 
by the country of residence of the financial institution making the loan.8 
To date the fiscal policy instrument has not been used actively in 
Ireland to reduce demand for housing in the current boom. It remains 
possible for the government to eliminate interest relief on mortgage 
interest payments in the income tax code. In addition there are a range of 
other fiscal measures that could directly reduce demand pressures in the 
building sector.9
While fiscal policy can be expected to play a significant role in 
moderating excessive demand pressures (or at least not adding to them) in 
an open economy, there are some additional factors that may reduce its 
effectiveness under current circumstances. Because of the exceptionally 
strong current financial position of the Irish government sector, the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy may be reduced through “Ricardian 
equivalence” effects (Whelan, 1991).10 For example, if the Irish 
government had tightened fiscal policy this year, raising the general 
government surplus from the expected 4.6 per cent of GDP to 6 per cent 
or more of GDP, it would have been quite clear to all economic agents 
that this was only a temporary measure. Government assurances that in 
future years there would be big cuts in taxation, or increases in services, 
would have been readily believed, and many economic agents would have 
behaved accordingly. Personal and company savings could have been 
further reduced, partially offsetting the impact of the fiscal tightening. 
While this effect would only offset a limited amount of any fiscal 
tightening it might not be a trivial effect where the fiscal tightening 
occurred through taxation.  
However, even if there were some evidence that “Ricardian 
equivalence” could offset the deflationary effects of higher taxes, this will 
not be true where fiscal policy is implemented through a change in the rate 
of increase in public employment. By acting on the labour market, changes 
in public sector employment directly impact on the rate of wage inflation. 
MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM ISSUES 
There are two medium- to long-term issues that must be taken into 
account when considering the appropriate stance of fiscal policy. First, 
there are the restrictions on debt financing under the Maastricht Treaty 
and the need to maintain flexibility in the public finances to deal with 
unexpected shocks. Second, there is the need to consider the long-term 
7 Murphy (1998) has shown an elasticity of house prices with respect to disposable household 
income of close to two. 
8 While UK financial institutions are lending in Ireland on Irish housing without having an 
office in Ireland, the mortgage must be registered in the country where the property is 
located. 
9 These include a withdrawal of special tax incentives for building. 
10 Individuals may take account of the implications for future tax liabilities of changes in 
government indebtedness. Thus increased government savings could give rise to the 
expectation of future tax cuts. Such an expectation could, in turn, affect current consumption.   8
 
ageing of the population and its implications for intergenerational equity 
and the public finances. 
As a member of EMU Ireland has taken on an obligation under the 
Maastricht treaty to ensure that government borrowing does not exceed 3 
percentage points of GDP in any individual year. Penalties are specified in 
the event a country breaks this rule. In an uncertain environment this 
makes it important to ensure that fiscal policy is operated with a safety 
margin to ensure that, whatever shocks occur, the economy stays within 
the Maastricht limit. 
The budget of all countries is significantly affected by the economic 
cycle. To ensure that the budget remains within the limit, while running a 
neutral budgetary policy, it will be important to keep the deficit, on 
average, significantly below the Maastricht limit. The extent to which the 
deficit must be kept below this limit to ensure that it is never exceeded, 
even in a recession, will depend on how responsive the public finances in 
an individual country are to cyclical changes in economic activity. 
A recent study for the OECD area (van den Noord, 2000) suggests 
that the structural deficit (at trend growth rates) will need to be between 
0.5 and 1.5 percentage points of GDP below the 3 per cent deficit 
threshold to ensure that this threshold will not be breached in the case of 
a serious recession. This would allow the automatic stabilisers to work and 
there would be no necessity to take pro-cyclical action to keep the deficit 
under control. In Scandinavia and the Netherlands their budgets are more 
sensitive to the economic cycle because of the characteristics of their 
public sectors. As a result, they would need a bigger margin to ensure that 
the limit will not be exceeded in a recession. When other risks are 
accounted for, this evidence suggests that for most members of EMU the 
Stability and Growth Pact guideline, that over the economic cycle the 
government sector should be in balance, is broadly appropriate.11
Duffy, Fitz Gerald and Smyth (2000) undertook a similar study of the 
sensitivity of the Irish economy to cyclical disturbances. Their conclusion 
was almost identical to that of van den Noord (2000) for the broad 
OECD area. For every one per cent reduction in the growth rate below 
potential, the government surplus would fall by 0.5 percentage points of 
GDP. This would imply that, provided the budget were maintained in 
balance over the cycle as required under the Stability and Growth Pact, 
there would be no danger of the government being forced to take 
procyclical action to cut the deficit, as happened in the 1980s. Thus the 
Stability and Growth Pact requirement to maintain balance in the public 
finances is what prudence would, in any event, require of Irish 
governments within EMU. 
Probably the biggest danger to the Irish economy lies in the possibility 
of a significant recession in the US. This could affect the Irish economy 
more than other EU members (Duffy and Fitz Gerald, 2000), exposing 
any overvaluation of the real exchange rate. However, the robust nature of 
the public finances leaves Ireland more secure in the face of external 
shocks than at any time in the last three decades. Even if there was a 
11 Barrell and Drury (2000), undertook a very similar exercise using the NiGEM model 
concluding that the main European economies could run somewhat looser deficit targets 
(between 1.5 and 2 per cent of GDP) than van den Noord (2000) suggested, while still having 
a 99 per cent chance of keeping within the limit.   9
recession in Ireland, it is likely in the first year of low growth the 
government would still be in surplus, leaving room for a countercyclical 
fiscal policy. 
In framing medium to long-term policy on the public finances the 
Irish authorities have adopted an innovative approach in providing for 
advanced provision to cover the long-term costs of ageing. While the 
problem of the “greying” of their economies is currently hitting many EU 
countries, it is a long way off for Ireland. The Medium-Term Review 
indicated that Ireland could expect to reap a significant “demographic 
dividend” over this decade as a result of the very low dependency rate. It 
will not be for another twenty years that the problem of ageing will begin 
to have a significant effect on the old-age dependency rate and even then 
it will be less acute than in many of our EU neighbours. However, to 
provide for the consequences of ageing the government has established a 
state pension fund. 
The National Pension Reserve Fund will accumulate over the next 
twenty-five years with an annual contribution from revenue of at least one 
percentage point of GNP. How this will interact with the commitments 
under the Stability and Growth Pact has not been made clear but it is 
anticipated that it will mean that, on average, the public sector will run a 
small surplus over the course of the current decade (see Lane, 2001). 
However, as Cronin and McCoy (2000) discuss, the existing EU guidelines 
have not taken this issue of long-run sustainability into account. The 
Maastricht guidelines and the Stability and Growth Pact did not envisage a 
situation where a country needs to run a significant surplus to provide for 
the effects of ageing. 
While the principles behind the establishment of the state pension 
fund are based on a concept of intergenerational equity, the allocation of 
one percentage point of GDP to saving to pay future pension liabilities is 
essentially an arbitrary number (Lane, 1999). Further research is needed to 
establish a framework in which the appropriate level of savings can be 
determined. However, whatever the outcome of such a process, it seems 
likely that the current level of government savings (on a cyclically adjusted 
basis) is greater than would be required to ensure fiscal sustainability and 
intergenerational equity in the long run. This means that over the course 
of the decade there should be a significant reduction in the cyclically 
adjusted surplus from its current level. 
As discussed above there are strong grounds for arguing that fiscal 
policy is today too expansionary for the needs of the Irish economy. 
However, once the economy slows down and the inflationary pressures 
ease in the domestic labour market, it will then be appropriate to wind 
down the surplus to its long-run sustainable level. This is in line with our 
recommendations in the last ESRI Medium-Term Review. This reduction in 
the surplus can take place by some combination of tax reductions, 
improvement in current services and improvements in public physical 
infrastructure. Because of the “demographic dividend”, provided that the 
resources are not frittered away through inflation over the next two years, 
progress should be possible on all fronts over the rest of the decade. The 
Commission’s strictures only apply to current circumstances. They will not 
in any way restrict future governments from pursuing an appropriate 
policy providing for intergenerational equity and long-term sustainability 
in the public finances.  
 The dispute between the European Council of Ministers, the EU 
Commission, and the Irish government highlights a number of issues of 






What is the necessary level of co-ordination of fiscal policy within the euro 
area? Co-ordination is desirable to ensure that fiscal policy action in one 
country does not adversely affect other euro area members – a good 
neighbour policy. Membership of EMU means that economic policy in 
individual members of the union can damage other members’ economies 
in ways that would not be possible if they were not a member of the 
union.  
This negative externality can arise from:  
(i)  The risk of default from excessive borrowing in one member 
raising interest rate risk premia for all;  
(ii)  Inappropriate fiscal policy in one country contributing to 
inappropriate fiscal policy in the aggregate euro area. Too 
stimulatory a fiscal policy in the euro area, whoever is 
responsible for it, requires the ECB to tighten interest rates, 
with adverse effects on all EMU members;  
(iii)  Risks to the solvency of the financial system. Any collapse in a 
regional or national financial system could potentially 
destabilise the system in EMU as a whole. Even if it did not, it 
could affect interest rate risk premia in other members of 
EMU. 
In co-ordinating the overall stance of fiscal policy in a national 
economy in a monetary union it is not necessary, or appropriate, to specify 
the mix of taxation and expenditure to be pursued in individual countries. 
What is important is the overall fiscal stance – the change in the cyclically 
adjusted deficit or surplus. It is this change in government saving that 
represents the ultimate impact on demand in the euro area. Even if 
individual countries are to be constrained to follow a particular path in 
terms of their government savings (deficit), they still have autonomy in 
determining what mix of expenditure and taxation they will use. 
In the medium term, it remains within the competence of individual 
members of EMU to determine the appropriate level of government 
saving or borrowing, consistent with the Maastricht guidelines and the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Any recommendation or directive on fiscal 
policy stance is essentially temporary − to deal with a cyclical imbalance 
between demand and supply within the union. 
How does membership of the euro area change the role of fiscal policy 
at the level of a national or regional economy within EMU? If fiscal policy 
at the level of the euro area is appropriate (not putting pressure on interest 
rates), then independent action by an individual regional economy does 
not adversely affect other members. However, if a fiscal stimulus in one 
country contributes to an inappropriate fiscal stance at the level of the 
euro area, there is the possibility that it will require a tightening of 
monetary policy, with negative consequences for all other EMU members. 
This potential negative externality is the main argument for co-ordination 
of fiscal policies (Buti and Martinot, 2000). Outside the euro area this need 
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for co-ordination would not arise because changes in demand in a country 
outside EMU would not have any direct effect on interest rates in the euro 
area. 
Co-ordinated fiscal policy action does not entail a harmonisation of tax 
or welfare rates across regional economies. A harmonisation of prices 
(including taxes and welfare rates) would prevent the normal adjustment 
processes necessary to promote convergence. Such differences are 
essential to ensure optimal use of resources within the euro area. 
However, there may be cases where discriminatory fiscal action may 
adversely affect other EU members but this will not be confined just to 
members of the euro area. It is also not an issue for the short-term 
management of the euro area economy and, as a result, it is not an issue to 
be considered in the guidelines for fiscal policy. 
While not an issue in the case of Ireland today, all the members of the 
euro area have a clear interest in the stability of regional financial systems 
within the zone. Instability in one region could easily translate into a 
problem for all members. However, the supervision of the regional 
financial systems remains a national prerogative.  
With the integration of the EU economy there may be a need to 
extend co-ordination of policy in this area. The example of the BCCI 
débacle in the UK shows the difficulties in supervising banking systems in 
a global environment. Globalisation may require further co-ordination of 
banking supervision to ensure that problems in multinational financial 
enterprises do not go undetected. 
GAINS FROM CO-ORDINATION 
The example of German unification highlights the gains to be obtained 
from effective fiscal policy co-ordination at the level of the euro area. In 
1990 the huge infrastructural deficit that existed in the Eastern Länder of 
the newly unified Germany posed major problems for its government. 
However, a decision was made that taxes would not be raised to cover the 
full costs of unification and government borrowing grew rapidly. This 
provided a very strong demand stimulus to the German economy. This 
stimulus was further accentuated by the decision to convert East German 
savings into deutschmarks at par. The consequence of the stimulatory 
fiscal policy pursued in Germany was that the Bundesbank had to tighten 
German monetary policy to offset the inflationary impact of the demand 
stimulus. However, the rise in interest rates in Germany was transmitted 
to all the other members of the ERM. Given the nature of the ERM this 
meant that there were serious negative externalities for the rest of the EU 
from procyclical German fiscal policy (Gagnon, Masson and McKibbin, 
1996 and Barrell, Pain and Hurst, 1996).12
If EMU had begun in 1990 with effective co-ordination of fiscal 
policy, it is likely that fiscal policy in Germany would have been much 
tighter than was actually the case in the early 1990s. The result would have 
been that the EU would have escaped the major rise in interest rates that 
actually occurred. Gagnon, Masson and McKibbin (1996) and Barrell, Pain 
and Hurst (1996), estimate that the cost of inappropriate fiscal policy in 
12 A realignment of currencies in the EMU, suggested at an early stage as a possibility by the 
German government, could have reduced this negative impact.   12
 
Germany in the early 1990s was a loss in GDP of 2 to 3 percentage points 
in the UK, France and other EU members (other than Germany). While 
the increased demand from Germany resulted in increased exports from 
other EU members, this beneficial effect was more than offset by the 
negative effects of higher interest rates.  
If these estimates of the negative externalities from inappropriate fiscal 
policy in Germany are put together with the direct cost to Ireland of high 
interest rates arising from the necessary tightening of monetary policy 
(Bradley, Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1991), the results suggest that the Irish 
boom of the late 1990s would actually have occurred in the early 1990s. A 
crude combination of the results from these studies would suggest that the 
reduction in Irish GNP arising from the combined reduction in EU 
growth and from high interest rates amounted to around 6 percentage 
points. This represented a very substantial negative shock to an economy 
that had been growing very rapidly in 1989. The incipient boom in Ireland 
was halted in its tracks in 1990. The situation was further aggravated by 
the impact of the slow-down on house prices and consumer confidence, 
factors not taken into account in the estimated costs to the Irish economy, 
discussed above.  
This is a very clear example where co-ordination of fiscal policy within 
an EMU could have been beneficial to a small country, such as Ireland. If 
there had been a monetary union in 1990 Germany would have taken into 
account the wider impact of its fiscal policy stance. In turn this would 
have required higher taxation in Germany to pay for unification but the 
consequence would have been much lower interest rates and higher 
growth elsewhere in the monetary union.13
For the future it is clear that disruptive fiscal policy action in large 
members of EMU, or disruptive action by a combination of smaller 
members of EMU, can impose significant economic costs on all member 
states. Under these circumstances it remains important for small countries 
that the EU Commission has the power to co-ordinate fiscal policy within 
the euro area.  
PROBLEMS WITH THE RULES FOR EMU 
The existing rules for the operation of EMU in the Maastricht Treaty and 
in the Stability and Growth Pact are clearly inadequate. While they deal 
with the potential problem of national insolvency in a rather heavy-handed 
way, they do not provide a mechanism for achieving necessary co-
ordination of fiscal policy in the euro area. The concentration on 
government borrowing and indebtedness is an artefact of when the 
guidelines were drawn up. At the time debt was very high and rising in 
many of the putative members of EMU. The guidelines do not adequately 
deal with the situation where countries are running fiscal surpluses and 
where indebtedness is falling rapidly, and may even disappear. 
Commenting recently on the Stability and Growth Pact, Buti and Martinot 
(2000), say: “In addition, as the cyclical behaviour of the euro area 
economy adapts to the new EMU environment, the issue of the 
appropriate medium-term targets for budget deficits will need to be 
addressed again”. 
13 In the long run such an outcome might also have been better for the German economy.   13
 
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the Member States reflects 
this inadequacy. The general “policy recommendations” section 
concentrates almost entirely on fiscal consolidation (debt reduction). Only 
one sentence is allocated to describing the appropriate stance of fiscal 
policy at the level of the Economic and Monetary Union.  
If these guidelines are compared to the national guidelines normally 
included in member states’ budgetary statements, they can be seen to be 
very inadequate in their consideration of the stance of fiscal policy. This 
gives the impression that the EU Commission still thinks of EMU as the 
total of the policies of the regional economies, rather than considering the 
appropriate stance of fiscal policy for the union as a whole. The 
Commission did not include in the Guidelines any measure of the overall 
impact of euro area fiscal policy.14 Instead each member state is required 
to publish a measure of regional fiscal policy stance in its national stability 
programme. This measure, published for each national economy, uses a 
similar, rather simplistic, measure. 
The inadequacy of the available measure of the stance of fiscal policy 
in the euro area is reflected in the failure to use it in discussing fiscal policy 
in the Guidelines. This is a serious gap in information as it makes it very 
difficult to judge how appropriate fiscal policy is to the economic and 
monetary conditions in EMU. This problem will become even more acute 
as new members join the EU and EMU.15
Even if there were an appropriate methodology for determining the 
actual stance of fiscal policy within the euro area, it remains to be 
determined how effective a mechanism fiscal policy will be at the level of 
the zone in managing demand. A priori one would expect that it would be 
more effective than at the individual regional (national) economy level. 
The approach taken by the Commission is first to consider whether 
each individual national economy’s fiscal policy is appropriate to the 
current situation in the individual economies. Thus Ireland’s fiscal policy is 
measured against the balance between supply and demand within that 
economy. However, even if the fiscal policy position in each individual 
regional or national economy is appropriate to the circumstances of its 
own economy there is no guarantee that the overall stance of euro area 
fiscal policy will be optimal. Precisely because externalities arise from the 
operation of national governments’ fiscal policies, there are good reasons 
for believing that fiscal policy arrived at in this manner will be sub-optimal 
for the monetary union.16
It may well be preferable to decide first on the appropriate fiscal policy 
for the euro area and then to apportion responsibility for implementing it 
to individual national governments.17 This need not require constant 
interference by the Commission in individual national economies. Looking 
at federal states, such as the USA and Germany, fiscal policy operated 
14 However, in European Economy (2000), they do publish such a measure, albeit using a rather 
crude measure along the lines published in each country's Stability Programme. 
15 For economies in transition the current method used by the EU Commission to measure 
fiscal stance is particularly inappropriate. 
16 It is also true that what may be “optimal” for the euro area may not be optimal for an 
individual country. 
17 Legally, implementation must be achieved through the individual country guidelines. reasonably successful in the past, in spite of considerable devolution of 
fiscal powers to individual länder or states.18  
For the future, in EMU the Commission need only interfere if the 
aggregation of national policies is seriously prejudicial to the interests of 
the union as a whole. A possible approach would be the following: if it is 
felt that fiscal policy in EMU is too lax, then responsibility for tightening is 
probably best allocated to those countries pursuing the most inappropriate 
domestic fiscal policies, measured in terms of their domestic needs. In the 
current context this would include Ireland. 
It would appear that the new context of EMU requires the 
development of appropriate aggregate measures of fiscal stance for the 
union. Research will be required to determine how effective an instrument 
union fiscal policy could be in maintaining balance between supply and 
demand within the union. Research is also needed to determine whether 
there is a loss in efficiency in defining optimal fiscal policy at a national 
level, as is currently the case, rather than determining it at the level of the 
union (see Bayoumi and Masson, 1995).  
Finally, if co-ordination of fiscal policy within EMU can provide clear 
welfare gains, then an effective method of developing and enforcing co-
ordination will have to be enacted. The existing framework is clearly 
unsatisfactory and it does not include adequate powers to ensure co-
ordination actually takes place. 
There remains the unresolved issue of how best the stability of 
regional financial systems within EMU can be ensured. As there exists the 
possibility that serious negative externalities for all members of EMU 
could arise from financial failure in national systems, there would also 
appear to be a need for greater policy co-ordination by the ECB in this 
area of economic activity. 
 
 The current controversy between the EU Council of Ministers (and the 
EU Commission) and the Irish government has political and strategic 
implications for Ireland that are not considered in this article. Instead the 
article concentrates on the underlying economic issues. 
5. 
Conclusions
The new context of EMU means that independent fiscal policy action 
in one member of the euro area has a new potential to impose costs on 
other members. As discussed in this article, while membership of EMU 
has significant economic benefits for its members, the potential to cause 
damage to fellow members is also significantly enhanced by EMU 
membership. As a result, there are two different points of view from 
which to consider the appropriateness of Irish fiscal policy: the point of 
view of the Irish citizen and the point of view of citizens of the rest of the 
EMU. While there will often be no conflict between these different 
viewpoints, there remains such a possibility, given the differing 
characteristics of the economies of the different member countries. 
For the EU Commission, representing the interests of the citizens of 
the wider euro area, the economic concern must be whether the aggregate 
stance of fiscal policy in EMU is too stimulatory. If it is then there is the 
danger that interest rates will be higher than necessary for all members of 
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18 While in the US there is no provision for the “bail out” of an individual state, there is in the 
case of Germany. This gives rise to moral hazard problems (Morgenroth, 2000).   15
EMU. However, while they did express some concern about the loosening 
of fiscal policy in EMU in the policy guidelines in the summer of 2000, 
subsequent events may have reduced their fears. In particular, the major 
slowdown in the US and the strengthening of the euro eases pressures on 
euro area one interest rates. Thus from a purely economic point of view, 
there may be less concern now than there would have been last summer 
about a pro-cyclical policy in Ireland. 
Looking to the longer term, it is very much in Ireland's interest that an 
appropriate mechanism is developed for achieving the necessary co-
ordination of fiscal policy with the euro area. As discussed in this article, 
Ireland has suffered in the past from inappropriate fiscal policy in the EU 
and it could suffer again in the future. However, the existing instrument 
for co-ordination is ineffective, both because it lacks an appropriate 
economic focus and also because it lacks mechanisms to ensure that such 
co-ordination is implemented. Developing such mechanisms is likely to be 
particularly important for the smaller members of the euro area. 
As discussed above, co-ordination need not and should not involve 
extensive restrictions on domestic fiscal freedom. In the spirit of the 
Maastricht guidelines, it should confine itself to action where the aggregate 
fiscal policy stance of the euro area is considered inappropriate. It can 
leave individual countries freedom of action to determine the appropriate 
mix of tax and expenditure changes needed to achieve a given national 
target surplus or deficit. Co-ordinated action is likely to prove necessary 
only in exceptional circumstances. The best national interests of most 
member states will normally produce a domestic fiscal policy stance 
consistent with the needs of EMU. 
There are lessons to be learned by the EU Commission from the 
current dispute. Significant further research will be needed to understand 
how domestic fiscal policies interact to affect the overall euro area 
economy and there will also need to be further development of the 
process for co-ordinating fiscal policy within EMU. As part of this process 
it would be helpful to develop a shared understanding of how individual 
economies in the EMU actually work. 
The danger for the Irish economy with the current expansionary 
stance of fiscal policy is that, by adding to inflationary expectations in the 
labour market and in the property market, the real exchange rate may 
overshoot − there may be an excessive rise in labour costs. Unless wage 
rates adjust instantaneously to clear the market, wage rate overshooting 
could prove costly. For this reason stimulatory fiscal policy, that 
accelerates the rate of wage inflation, is unwise. It could expose the 
economy to unnecessary dislocation in the event of an unexpected 
external shock. The cost that would be involved in pursuing a tighter fiscal 
stance today would be a temporary delay in consumption. The cost 
involved in the current pro-cyclical stance is an increased danger of 
significant economic disruption in the future. 
The tightness of the labour market today means that it will prove 
difficult for the government to recruit to fill all the additional jobs in the 
wider public sector created as part of the 2001 Budget. As a result, it may 
well be apparent from the first half exchequer returns that there will be a 
significant underspend this year due to an inability to fill vacancies. Such 
an outturn could end the current impasse, bringing the overall fiscal stance 
broadly into line with that desired by the EU Commission. REFERENCES 
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